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Abstract
We address an important business cycle fact, i.e., the amplified and hump-shaped
responses of output to productivity shocks, in a dynamic general equilibrium model
with financial frictions. Models with financial frictions in the current literature
have either the amplification mechanism or the propagation mechanism. Our model
shows that the dynamic interaction of borrowing constraints, endogenous capital ac-
cumulation and capital reallocation among agents with different productivity con-
stitutes a mechanism through which the effects of productivity shock on aggregate
output are amplified and propagated, more in line with the empirical evidence than
other related models in the literature.
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1 Introduction
One of the well-known deficiencies of the canonical RBC models is the lack of the sufficient
propagation and amplification mechanism1, as pointed out by Cogley and Nason (1993,
1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Because the aggregate capital stock is the only endogenous
state variable in these models, the dynamic structure is essentially ARMA(1, 1) and
fails to replicate an important empirical fact, i.e., the amplified and hump-shaped output
responses to productivity shocks. Many studies in the literature introduce various frictions
into the RBC framework. Additional endogenous state variables help reinforce the internal
propagation mechanism. Credit market imperfections are one of these variations.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Kato (2006) introduce financial frictions into
the production of capital goods. In addition to the aggregate capital stock, the net worth
of capital goods producers becomes another endogenous state variables and is essential
for their borrowing capacity. A positive TFP (total factor productivity) shock raises the
aggregate demand for capital and the price of capital rises. Although the projects of
capital goods producers become more profitable than before, they are subject to credit
constraints and cannot expand their investment scale to fully exploit this opportunity.
They have to accumulate net worth over time and the supply of capital adapts to the de-
mand in a few periods after the shock. Given that capital is one of the two inputs for the
aggregate production of final goods, the delayed and dampened responses of investment
result in the hump-shaped and depressed dynamics of aggregate output, in comparison
with the frictionless RBC model. Although financial frictions in the production of cap-
ital goods help generate the positive autocorrelation of aggregate output qualitatively,
aggregate output peaks only two periods after the shock and the maximum value of the
output responses is even smaller than in the corresponding RBC model. However, Cogley
and Nason (1995) show that aggregate output peaks four quarters after the shock in the
United States. Furthermore, Andolfatto (1996) shows that the volatility of aggregate out-
put around its trend in the actual U.S. economy is even more than what the frictionless
RBC model can predict.
Another line of research on financial frictions, e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Chen (2001), shows that the interaction between credit constraints and the reallocation
of productive assets among agents with different productivity can amplify the output
responses to exogenous shocks. In these models, the productive asset has a fixed total
supply. A TFP shock has the immediate effects on asset reallocation and output peaks
one-period after the shock. So, these models are lack of the propagation mechanism in
the sense that output does not have the hump-shaped dynamic patterns.
1“Amplification” refers to the mechanism through which relatively small shocks result in large output
fluctuations, while “propagation” refers to the mechanism through which a transitory productivity shock
generates positive autocorrelation in aggregate output.
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We analyze how the dynamic interactions of borrowing constraints, endogenous capital
accumulation and reallocation among agents with different productivity can affect the
responses of output, credit, and investment to a transitory TFP shock. We compare our
model with a simplified version of models with financial frictions, e.g., Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Kato (2006), and show that our model outperforms other models
in generating both amplified and more delayed output responses, which is more in line
with the empirical evidence.
The intuition is explained as follows. We introduce an intermediate good sector into
a standard RBC model with capital accumulation. There are two types of agents, house-
holds and entrepreneurs. Both agents have projects to produce intermediate goods using
capital. Intermediate goods and labor are then employed to produce final goods contem-
poraneously. Final goods can be either consumed or transformed one-to-one into capital
goods without frictions. The entrepreneurs’ project is more productive than that of house-
holds. If entrepreneurs could fully pledge their project outcomes for external funds, their
project investment would be fully financed externally and capital would be all allocated
to their projects. However, due to unobservable project choice a` la Holmstro¨m and Tirole
(1997), entrepreneurs can pledge only a fraction of their project outcomes for loans and
their own funds are required to fill in the gap between total investment and loans. Thus,
entrepreneurial net worth is essential for their project investment.
A positive TFP shock raises aggregate demand and pushes up the price of intermediate
goods. Extra sales revenues improve entrepreneurial net worth and enable them to acquire
more loans and capital goods. The excess demand for loans pushes up the loan rate and
induces households to lend more to the entrepreneurial sector as well as reduce their
capital holding. There are two positive effects on aggregate output in the next period:
the accumulation of the aggregate capital stock and the reallocation of capital goods from
the less productive agents (households) to the more productive agents (entrepreneurs).
However, it takes time for entrepreneurs to accumulate net worth and they cannot
acquire enough loans to expand their investment scale sufficiently in the shock period.
Capital reallocation from households to entrepreneurs is delayed, and output responds to
shocks in a delayed fashion, too. Endogenous capital accumulation and gradual realloca-
tion of capital goods among agents with different productivity makes aggregate output
peak four periods after the shock and its magnitude is larger than in the corresponding
RBC model, which are in line with the empirical evidence.
In order to compare the performance of our basic model with that of Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Kato (2006), we analyze a model with financial frictions in the
production of capital goods. Lack of the amplification mechanism, the model with finan-
cial frictions in the production of capital goods only generates dampened hump-shaped
output responses in the sense that aggregate output peaks two periods after the shock and
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its magnitude is smaller than in the corresponding RBC model. In other words, these
models obtain the propagation mechanism by sacrificing the amplification mechanism.
In order to see whether introducing more financial frictions into our basic model can
improve the model performance, we analyze a model with double financial frictions in
the production of both capital and intermediate goods. A TFP shock pushes up the
price of capital and capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth. Entrepreneurs can
increase loans and capital investment while the rise in the price of capital forces households
to reduce their capital stock, both in a larger magnitude than in our basic model. In
other words, the amplification mechanism is enhanced qualitatively. However, the output
dynamics are almost the same as in our basic model. In this sense, the dynamic interaction
of borrowing constraints, endogenous capital accumulation and reallocation in our basic
model are sufficient to explain the empirical evidence alone.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the financial contracting problems under alternative scenarios. Section 4
calibrates the model and analyzes the model dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents the general model with financial frictions in the production sectors
of capital and intermediate goods. We can easily analyze the role of financial frictions in
one sector by shutting off the moral hazard problem in the other sector.
2.1 Overview
There are three goods in the economy: a capital good, an intermediate good, and a final
good. The capital good is durable, while the intermediate good and the final good are
perishable. There are three types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, and capital goods
producers, each of unit mass.2
Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. They have a safe project to produce
intermediate goods using capital. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and each has a constant
probability of death pi ∈ (0, 1). In each period, entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pi) exit from
the economy and new entrepreneurs of the same mass are born, keeping their population
constant. Each entrepreneur has three projects for the production of intermediate goods
using capital and the projects are subject to idiosyncratic risk: projects have positive out-
put in the case of success and there is no output in the case of failure. Each entrepreneur
can choose only one project and his project choice is unobservable to others. It takes
one period for households and entrepreneurs to complete their projects. Each agent is
2The relative population size of agents does not matter for our results. Section 4 shows that the
dynamics of aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs and capital goods producers mainly drive our results.
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endowed with a unit of labor. Final goods are produced using intermediate goods and
labor inputs of the three types of agents contemporaneously.
The aggregate capital stock depreciates at a constant rate. Capital goods producers
are risk neutral and infinitely lived. They have three projects to transform final goods
into capital goods contemporaneously and the projects have similar features as those of
entrepreneurs. Final goods can also be consumed and is chosen as the numeraire. Newly-
produced and existing capital goods are perfect substitutes. Let qt and vt denote the price
of capital and intermediate goods; let wt, w
e
t , and w
c
t denote the wage rates of households,
entrepreneurs, and capital goods producers, respectively.
The least risky project of entrepreneurs is expected to be more productive than that of
households and the least risky project of capital goods producers has an expected rate of
return of unity. As financial intermediaries have exclusive technology to (partially) screen
the projects of entrepreneurs and capital goods producers, loans are intermediated through
financial intermediaries. There is no direct borrowing and lending among individual agents
in our model economy.
As it takes one period for entrepreneurs to complete projects, financial intermedi-
aries provide them with one-period loans and rt denotes the gross interest rate. If en-
trepreneurs could credibly choose the least risky project, their project investment would
be fully financed by financial intermediaries. However, due to unobservable project choice,
entrepreneurs have to put own funds into the projects so as to let financial intermediaries
be sure that they choose the least risky project.
As capital goods producers complete projects within one period, financial interme-
diaries provide them with intra-period loans and the gross loan rate is unity. Due to
unobservable project choice, capital goods producers have to finance part of their project
investment using own funds so as to let financial intermediaries be sure that they choose
the least risky project.
Financial intermediaries can perfectly diversify loan portfolios ex ante and enforce
debt repayments ex post. They pool the idiosyncratic project risk of entrepreneurs and
capital goods producers, and guarantee a safe rate of return on deposits. Due to perfect
competition, financial intermediaries break even and make no profit.
An exogenous productivity shock realizes at the beginning of each period.
2.2 Households
Households have identical preferences over consumption and leisure,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt
1− σ + χ
(1− lt)1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
,
where Et is the expectation operator based on information available in period t and
β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor. ct and lt denote household consumption and
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labor supply in period t, respectively.
Given that kt−1 units of capital goods were invested in the household project in period
t− 1, G(kt−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of period t.
Assumption 1. G′(k) > 0 and G′′(k) ≤ 0.
Assumption 1 implies that the household project is (quasi-) decreasing return to scale.
The sales revenue and wage income of households are vtG(kt−1) and wtlt, respectively.
In addition, they receive rt−1dt−1 from financial intermediaries, where dt−1 denotes their
inter-period deposits made in period t− 1. At the end of period t, they invest kt units of
capital goods in their projects, deposit dt units of final goods at the financial intermedi-
aries, and consume ct units of final goods. Their flow-budget constraints are,
qt[kt − (1− δ)kt−1] + dt + ct = vtG(kt−1) + wtlt + rt−1dt−1,
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate of the capital invested in the household project.
The optimization over {ct, lt, kt, dt} gives the equilibrium conditions,
wt = χ(1− lt)ψcσt , (1)
1 = βrtEt
(
ct+1
ct
)−σ
, (2)
rtqt = Et [(1− δ)qt+1 + vt+1G′(kt)] . (3)
2.3 Unobservable Project Choices
Each entrepreneur can invest capital goods into one of the three projects: “Good”, “Bad”,
or “Rotten”. The project generates Re units of intermediate goods per unit of capital
invested and the invested capital depreciates at a rate δ, if the project succeeds; if the
project fails, there is no output and the invested capital is fully lost.
Similarly, capital goods producers have another three projects: “Good”, “Bad”, or
“Rotten” , with which they transform one unit of final goods into Rc units of capital
goods, if the project succeed; otherwise, there is no output of capital goods and the
invested final goods are wasted.
The project choices of entrepreneurs and capital goods producers are irreversible and
project outcomes are perfectly verifiable at no costs. They also enjoy safe, nonpecuniary
private benefits3 during the project process. For convenience of aggregation, we assume
that the private benefits from the projects of entrepreneurs (capital goods producers)
3We follow the Principal-Agent setting in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997). According to Hart (1995),
private benefits may refer to any nonpecuniary benefits from running a project, e.g., large offices or luxury
business cars. Private benefits are good for the project owners but may reduce the success probability of
projects. The trade-off between the success probability and private benefits is a short-cut to capture the
divergent objectives between the project owners and outside financiers.
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are proportional to their project investment in terms of capital goods (final goods). The
projects differ in the probability of success and private benefits per unit of investment. Let
{pGm, pBm, pRm} and {bGm, bBm, bRm} denote the success probabilities of projects “Good”, “Bad”,
“Rotten” and the private benefits per unit of investment in the respective project, where
m ∈ {e, c} denotes the project attributes of entrepreneurs and capital goods producers;
0 < pRm = p
B
m < p
G
m ≤ 1 and bRm > bBm > bGm = 0 imply that projects “Rotten” and “Bad”
are riskier than project “Good”, but project “Rotten” yields highest private benefits and
project “Good” yields lowest private benefits to project owners. Individual agents cannot
observe the project choices of others. Financial intermediaries have expertise in screening
out project “Rotten” at no costs but cannot distinguish between project “Good” and
project “Bad”. The advantage of financial intermediaries over individual agents justifies
the fact that there is no direct borrowing and lending among individual agents. See
Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) for a detailed description.
2.4 Entrepreneurs
As each entrepreneur has a probability of death each period and his project may be subject
to idiosyncratic risk, entrepreneurs differ in their end-of-period wealth. As shown below,
due to the linear nature of their preference and technologies, their project investment
and loans are proportional to their end-of-period wealth (entrepreneurial net worth in
the project). In other words, only the first moment of their net worth matters for the
economic allocation in the entrepreneurial sector. We focus only on the economic behavior
of an “average” entrepreneur and do not have to trace the that of each entrepreneur.4 For
simplicity, we assume that project “Good” has a success probability of pGe = 1.
The “average” entrepreneur, who stays in the economy to the next period, has linear
preferences over consumption and private benefits,
E0
T˜∑
t=0
βs
[
cet + Beket−1
]
, (4)
where T˜ is the stochastic time of death and Be ∈ {bGe , bBe , bRe } denotes private benefits
per unit of the capital invested in project “Good”, “Bad”, or “Rotten”, respectively. cet
denotes his consumption in period t and ket−1 denotes the capital invested in period t− 1.
Our calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive expected net
present value in equilibrium,
Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1]
rt
> qt >
pBe Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1] + bBe
rt
,
Thus, other projects should not be financed in equilibrium.
4See von Hagen and Zhang (2006) for detailed description.
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Our calibration also guarantees that project “Good” is always more productive than
the household project, Re > G
′(0). Thus, if entrepreneurs could credibly choose project
“Good”, they would borrow against all outcomes of project “Good” and intermediate
goods would be produced by them only.
The entrepreneur invest ket units of capital goods in either project “Good” or project
“Bad” in period t, using his own funds net and inter-period loans z
e
t . Thus, n
e
t is en-
trepreneurial net worth in the project. The loan contract specifies a promise to repay
Retk
e
t units of final goods in period t + 1, if the project succeeds; both parties get zero
pecuniary return, if the project fails. The entrepreneur always gets private benefits. In
order to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”, financial intermediaries
must provide him with enough incentives,
{Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1 −Ret ] + bGe }ket ≥ {pBe Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1 −Ret ] + bBe }ket .
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he chooses
project “Good” (“Bad”). As the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the
interest rate, the entrepreneur prefers to borrow to the limit. The incentive constraints
are binding around the steady state and is simplified to be
Ret = Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1]− be, where be ≡
bBe − bGe
1− pBe
> 0. (5)
Any promise to repay more than Retk
e
t to the financial intermediaries in the case of success
is not credible. Et[Revt+1+(1−δ)qt+1] andRet are the expected full value and external value
per unit of the capital invested in project “Good”, respectively. The difference between
the two values, be, is used to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good” despite
the lower private benefits it provides, bGe < b
B
e .
Financial intermediaries are expected to break even in lending to the entrepreneur in
period t, rtz
e
t = R
e
tk
e
t . This implies a credit constraint for him,
zet = Γ
e
tn
e
t , where Γ
e
t ≡
Ret
rtqt −Ret
(6)
is the credit multiplier. As we are interested in the case where entrepreneurs finance their
project using both own funds and external funds, our calibration guarantees that the cost
per unit of capital invested in the entrepreneur’s project is larger than the discounted
external value per unit capital invested, qt >
Ret
rt
, around the steady state. Therefore,
the entrepreneur has to put own funds in the project and Γet is positive. Otherwise,
entrepreneurs could finance their projects using external funds only. As Γet is independent
of net , loans are proportional to entrepreneurial net worth and so are their capital stock,
ket =
zet+n
e
t
qt
=
Γet+1
qt
net .
Suppose that entrepreneurs finance their project investment using loans in period t−1.
After the project completion in period t, entrepreneurs of mass pi get the signal of survival
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and the rest have to exit from the economy. Entrepreneurs who receive the signal of death
are of mass (1− pi). They repay their liabilities, sell off their capital stock, and consume
all proceeds before they exit from the economy.
As the expected rate of return on their net worth in project “Good” exceeds the in-
terest rate, the newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs supply their labor endowment
inelastically let = 1 to the production of final goods and their wage income is w
e
t . At the
end of period t, the entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility function defined in (4),
subject to his credit constraints specified in equation (6) and period budget constraints,
qtk
e
t − zet = net , where net = N et − cet ,
N et denotes his end-of-period wealth. The newcomers are of mass (1− pi) and their end-
of-period wealth is N et = wet ; entrepreneurs who survive to the next period are of mass
pi and their end-of-period wealth is N et = wet + [Revt + (1 − δ)qt − Ret−1]ket−1. As the
marginal rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the interest rate, entrepreneurs invest
all wealth, borrow to the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death.
In the aggregate, per capita consumption cet , net worth nt, and capital stock k
e
t of
entrepreneurs are,
cet = (1− pi)[Revt + (1− δ)qt −Ret−1]ket−1, (7)
net = pi[Revt + (1− δ)qt −Ret−1]ket−1 + wet , (8)
ket =
net + z
e
t
qt
. (9)
2.5 Capital Goods Producers
Due to idiosyncratic risk on their projects, capital goods producers differ in their end-of-
period wealth. Similar as the case of entrepreneurs, the linear preference and technologies
of capital goods producers enable us to focus on an “average” capital goods producer
instead of tracing the exact wealth distribution of capital goods producers.
The capital goods producer has linear preferences,
E0
∞∑
t=0
(γβ)s(cct + Bcit), (10)
where cct and it denote his consumption and project investment; Bc ∈ {bGc , bBc , bRc } denotes
private benefits per unit of final goods invested in project “Good”, “Bad” or “Rotten”;
γ ∈ (0, 1) implies that capital goods producers are less patient than households and en-
trepreneurs. It guarantees that their credit constraints are always binding in equilibrium.
As the capital goods producer does not care about leisure, he supplies labor endowment,
lct = 1, inelastically to the production of final goods. Our calibration guarantees that only
project “Good” has a positive expected net present value,
pGc Rcqt > 1 > p
B
c Rcqt + b
B
c ,
9
given that the gross rate of intra-period loan is unity. Therefore, only project “Good”
should be financed. For simplicity, we assume pGc Rc = 1, i.e., final goods are transformed
one-to-one into capital goods in the aggregate.
After final goods are produced in period t, the total wealth of capital goods producer
consists of his wage income, wct and the gross return on his inter-period deposits made in
period t−1, dct−1. In equilibrium, he uses own funds, nct = rt−1dct−1+wct , and intra-period
loans, zct , to finance his project investment, it. Thus, n
c
t is his net worth in the project.
According to the loan contract, the capital goods producer promises a repayment of Rct it
units of final goods if the project succeeds; both parties get zero return if the project fails.
The capital goods producer always get the private benefits. In order to motivate the
capital goods producer to choose project “Good”, financial intermediaries must provide
him with enough incentives,
pGc (Rcqt −Rct)it + bGc it ≥ pBc (Rcqt −Rct)it + bBc it.
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the capital goods producer if he
chooses project “Good” (“Bad”). As shown below, the expected rate of return on project
“Good” exceeds the intra-period loan rate, i.e., unity. The capital goods producer prefers
to borrow to the limit. The incentive constraints are binding around the steady state and
is simplified to be
Rct = Rcqt − bc, where bc ≡
bBc − bGc
pGc − pBc
> 0. (11)
Any promise to repay more than Rct it to the financial intermediaries in the case of success
is not credible. pGc Rcqt and p
G
c R
c
t are the expected full value and external value per unit
of final goods invested in project “Good”, respectively. The difference between the two
values, pGc bc, is used to motivate the capital goods producer to choose project “Good”
despite lower private benefits it provides, bGc < b
B
c .
Financial intermediaries are expected to break even in lending to the capital goods
producer in period t, zct = p
G
c R
c
t it. This implies credit constraints for him,
zct = Γ
c
tn
c
t , where Γ
c
t ≡
pGc R
c
t
1− pGc Rct
is the credit multiplier. Our calibration guarantees that the cost per unit of final goods
invested in the project is larger than the external value per unit of final goods invested,
pGc R
c
t < 1, around the steady state and thus, Γ
c
t > 0. Otherwise, he could finance his
project investment using external funds only. As Γct is independent of n
c
t , loans and the
project investment are both proportional to his net worth.
Each unit of the net worth of the capital goods producer enables him to acquire Γct
units of intra-period loans and so, he invests 1+Γct units of final goods in project “Good”.
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The expected gross rate of return on his net worth is
ξt = p
G
c (Rcqt −Rct)(1 + Γct) =
pGc bc
pGc bc − (qt − 1)
. (12)
The expected one-to-one transformation of final goods into capital goods implies that the
price of capital must be no less than unity. Otherwise, the project would make a loss,
ξt < 1. If the price of capital is at unity, qt = 1, the project breaks even by expectation,
ξt = 1. In this case, the capital goods producer does not invest own funds in the project.
If the price of capital is larger than unity, qt > 1, the project is profitable by expectation,
ξt > 1, because the rate of return on the project is larger than the intra-period loan rate
which is constant at unity. In this case, the capital goods producer puts all own funds in
the project and borrows to the limit.
Capital goods producers who have successful projects are of mass pGc and their end-
of-period wealth is N ct = (Rcqt − Rct)(1 + Γct)nct ; those who have failed projects are of
mass (1 − pGc ) and their end-of-period wealth is N ct = 0. At the end of period t, the
capital goods producer chooses consumption and deposits at the financial intermediaries
to maximizes his expected utility (10), subject to his period budget constraints,
dct + c
c
t = N ct .
The linear preference implies that their marginal utility of consumption is one. If they
deposit a unit of final goods at the financial intermediaries in period t, they will get a
safe rate of return, rt > 1, in period t+ 1. They can invest the deposit return in project
“Good” for the expected return of Etrtξt+1. The optimization between consumption and
deposit at the end of period t gives the equilibrium condition,
1 = Etγβrtξt+1. (13)
Per capita deposits, net worth, and investment of capital goods producers are,
dct = ξtn
c
t − cct , (14)
nct = rt−1d
c
t−1 + w
c
t , (15)
it =
nct
1− pGc Rct
. (16)
In equilibrium, the aggregate capital stock depreciates at the same rate in both house-
hold and entrepreneurial sectors. The aggregate capital stock Kt evolves as follows,
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + it. (17)
2.6 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries make intra-period loans to capital goods producers after final
goods are produced; at the end of the period, the capital goods producers with success-
ful projects repay their liabilities. The financial intermediaries also make inter-period
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loans to entrepreneurs at the end of the period; at the beginning of the next period, the
entrepreneurs with successful projects repay their liabilities.
Consider the intra-period business of the financial intermediaries. There is no ag-
gregate uncertainty during the capital goods production. By perfectly diversifying the
portfolios of intra-period loans, the financial intermediaries pool idiosyncratic project
risk of capital goods producers. Due to perfect competition, the financial intermediaries
transfer all of the debt repayments to depositors and make zero profit in their intra-period
business. Therefore, intra-period deposits have a safe rate of return at unity and we do
not have to specify the supply of intra-period deposits explicitly. The results hold in the
case of observable project choice.
Consider now the inter-period business of the financial intermediaries. As specified
in subsection 2.4, entrepreneurs choose project “Good” in equilibrium. They repay a
predetermined amount Ret−1k
e
t−1 to financial intermediaries in period t and their end-of-
period wealth is
[Revt + (1− δ)qt −Ret−1]ket−1 = [Re(vt − Et−1vt) + (1− δ)(qt − Et−1qt) + be]ket−1
Due to productivity shocks, the prices of capital and intermediate goods may differ from
their expected values in the previous period, qt 6= Et−1qt and vt 6= Et−1vt. The expected
reward to entrepreneurs bek
e
t−1 acts as a buffer and enables entrepreneurs to repay the
promised amount to the financial intermediaries. By perfectly diversifying loan portfolios,
the financial intermediaries pool the idiosyncratic project risk of entrepreneurs. Thus,
the ex post total repayment from the entrepreneurial sector in period t coincides with its
expected value in period t− 1, i.e., Ret−1ket−1 = rt−1zet−1, and the financial intermediaries
pay a safe rate of return on inter-period deposits.
However, these results do not hold in the case of observable project choice. In this
case, entrepreneurs finance all of the project investment using loans and they do not have
to put own funds in the project in period t. In period t + 1, entrepreneurs transfer all
of the project outcomes to financial intermediaries; they only get private benefits and
do not have any claim in the project. By lending zet−1 to entrepreneurs in period t − 1,
financial intermediaries get [Revt + (1− δ)qt]ket−1 in period t. The ex post rate of return
on inter-period loans is
r˜t =
[Revt + (1− δ)qt]ket−1
zet−1
= rt−1
[
1 +
Re(vt − Et−1vt) + (1− δ)(qt − Et−1qt)
ReEt−1vt + (1− δ)Et−1qt
]
, (18)
which may be different from its expected value in period t− 1, r˜t 6= Et−1r˜t = rt−1. So is
the ex post rate of return on inter-period deposits.
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2.7 Final Goods Production and Market Equilibrium
Final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor,
Yt = AtM
α
t L
(1−α−αe−αc)
t (L
e
t )
αe(Lct)
αc , (19)
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + t, (20)
whereMt denotes the input of intermediate goods; Lt, L
e
t , and L
c
t denote the labor inputs
of households, entrepreneurs, and capital goods producers. Total factor productivity, At,
is positively autocorrelated in logarithms, where ρ ∈ (0, 1). The productivity shock has
mean zero, Ett+1 = 0, and variance, σ
2
a.
Productive inputs are priced at their respective marginal products,
vtMt = αYt, (21)
wtLt = (1− α− αe − αc)Yt, (22)
wctL
c
t = αcYt, (23)
wetL
e
t = αeYt. (24)
As shown in subsections 2.4 and 2.5, loans and project investment of the two types of
agents are proportional to their respective net worth. The assumption of the labor incomes
of entrepreneurs and capital goods producers is necessary because it ensures that each
entrepreneur and capital goods producer always has a positive level of net worth. In the
meantime, we make their wage income very small so that the dynamics of their net worth
is not driven by the wage income. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) take the same approach.
Markets for capital, intermediate goods, final goods, and credit clear,
Kt = kt + k
e
t , (25)
Mt = G(kt−1) +Reket−1, (26)
Yt = ct + c
c
t + c
e
t + it, (27)
zet = d
c
t + dt, (28)
Definition 1. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {kt, lt, ct, dt}, en-
trepreneurs, {ket , net , cet , zet }, capital goods producers, {nct , it, cct , dct}, and aggregate variables
{Mt, Yt, Kt}, as well as a set of prices {vt, qt, wt, wet , wct , rt, ξt, Ret , Rct} and the exogenous
process {At} satisfying equations (1)-(3), (5)-(9), (11)-(17), (19)-(28).
3 Three Alternative Models
Section 2 specifies the model with financial frictions in the production of both capital and
intermediate goods. We call it Model DF (double frictions). This section discusses three
alternative models, depending on the side of the moral hazard problem.
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3.1 Model FE
In the first case, we assume that the project choice of capital goods producers is observable
but that of entrepreneurs is not. Thus, capital goods producers can credibly choose
project “Good” and financial frictions exist only in the entrepreneurial sector. It is our
basic model and is called model FE (frictions in the entrepreneurial sector).
Capital goods producers can pledge all of the project outcome to financial intermedi-
aries and finance their project investment using intra-period loans only, it = z
c
t = qtp
G
c Rcit.
Thus, capital goods are priced at qt = 1, and they do not have to put own funds in the
project, nct = 0. As the deposit rate is less than their time preference rate in equilibrium,
rt <
1
γβ
, they do not make inter-period deposits at the financial intermediaries, dct = 0.
They consume wage income each period, cct = w
c
t . For simplicity, we focus on a symmetric
equilibrium in which all capital goods producers invest the same amount of final goods it
in project “Good” and enjoy private benefits, bGc ct. Other sectors are same as in model
DF .
3.2 Model FC
In the second case, we assume that the project choice of entrepreneurs is observable but
that of capital goods producers is not. Thus, entrepreneurs can credibly choose project
“Good” and financial frictions exist only in the capital goods production sector. We call
it model FC (frictions in the capital goods production).
Entrepreneurs can pledge all of the project outcome to financial intermediaries, and fi-
nance their project investment using inter-period loans only, qtk
e
t = z
e
t =
[Revt+1+(1−δ)qt+1]ket
rt
.
They do not have to put own funds in the project, net = 0. Given that project “Good” is
expected to be more productive than that of households, all capital stock is allocated to
entrepreneurs and households do not produce intermediate goods. For simplicity, we focus
on a symmetric equilibrium in which the newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs use
external funds to invest the same amount of capital goods ket and enjoy private benefits,
bGe k
e
t in period t+ 1. They consume their wage income each period, c
e
t = w
e
t .
As shown in 2.6, the ex post rate of return on inter-period deposits is different from
its expected value in the previous period in the case of observable project choice of en-
trepreneurs. For uniformity, we use rt to denote the expected rate of return on inter-period
deposits, rt ≡ Etr˜t+1. Other sectors remain the same as in the setting with double finan-
cial frictions.
3.3 Model RBC
In the last case, we assume that the project choices of entrepreneurs and capital goods
producers are observable. Thus, both can credibly choose project “Good” and pledge all
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the expected outcomes of their projects for external funds. Their project investment is
fully financed by the financial intermediaries and they do not have to provide own funds.
The price of capital is constant at unity, qt = 1 and the projects of capital goods producers
earn zero profits, ξt = 1. Capital is all allocated to entrepreneurs and intermediate goods
are produced by entrepreneurs only.
In this case, the model degenerates into a RBC model with a representative agent who
has three production technologies: a linear technology to produce intermediate goods us-
ing capital, a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce final goods using intermediate goods
and labor, and a linear technology to transform final goods into capital goods. So, we
call it model RBC. The market equilibrium can be defined as the set of two state vari-
ables {ket , At} and eleven control variables {ct, lt, wt, cet , wet , cct , wct , it, vt,Mt, Yt} satisfying
equations from (29) to (39),
1 = βEt
(
ct+1
ct
)−σ
[(1− δ) +Revt+1], (29)
wt = χ(1− lt)ψ(ct)σ, (30)
Mt = Rek
e
t−1, (31)
Yt = AtM
α
t L
1−α−αe−αc
t , (32)
vtMt = αYt, (33)
wtlt = (1− α− αe − αc)Yt, (34)
cct = w
c
t = αcYt, (35)
cet = w
e
t = αeYt, (36)
Yt = ct + c
e
t + c
c
t + it, (37)
ket = (1− δ)ket−1 + it, (38)
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + t. (39)
Other variables {rt, r˜t, dt} are inessential to the market equilibrium and can be determined
by these eleven variables as shown in subsections 3.1 and 3.2.
4 Dynamic Analysis
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate our basic model (model FE) to fulfill some conditions in the non-stochastic
steady state. The other three models use the same calibration for consistency.
The quarterly discount factor is set at β = 0.99, corresponding to an annual interest
rate of 4%, while the relative impatience of capital goods producers versus other is set at
γ = 0.95, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Kato (2006). By convention, we
choose the logarithmic preferences for households, σ = 1 and ψ = −1. We set χ = 1.92 so
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that households work eight hours a day in the final goods production sector in the steady
state, L = 1
3
. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we set αe = αc = 0.00001 so that
even the entrepreneurs and capital goods producers with failed projects still have a small
wealth to start the projects. We set α = 0.36 so that the household wage income accounts
for almost 64% of the aggregate output of final goods.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998), we choose ρ = 0.95 for the autocorrela-
tion coefficient of TFP and the standard deviation of the TFP shocks is set at σa = 0.007.
Capital invested in the projects of households and entrepreneurs depreciates at a quarterly
rate of δ = 2.5%.
As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), a quarterly rate of business failure at 1% implies
that pGc = 0.99. The assumption that capital goods are produced one-to-one in the
aggregate from final goods implies Rc =
1
pGc
= 1.01. The expected profitability of the
projects of capital goods producers is ξ = 1
γ
> 1 in the steady state so that they invest
all own funds into the projects and borrow to the limit. We set bc = 0.53 so that
capital goods producers finance half of project investment using intra-period loans, as in
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
Our results do not depend on the aggregate capital stock and we normalize it at unity.
Capital-output ratio ranges from 2.8 for US (Jones, 2002) to 1.8 for Japan (Hayashi and
Prescott, 2002). We set K
Y
= 2.2. Entrepreneurs finance half of the their project invest-
ment using external funds, as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). We calibrate
the production functions of entrepreneurs and households in order to match the above
conditions. The household production function takes the the following form,
G(k) =
gkt for 0 < k ≤ k,
1+λ
k1+λ for k > k,
thus, G′(k) =
g for 0 < k ≤ k,kλ for k > k,
where g = 
1+λ
kλ. We set {Re = 1.34, be = 0.76,  = 0.145, λ = −0.2, k = 0.0001}. In
equilibrium, the expected marginal product of project “Good” of entrepreneurs always
exceeds that of the household project Re = 1.33 > g = 1.14. As the steady state
value of the households’ capital stock is k = 0.5, the household production function is
differentiable around the steady state. Note that a simple shift of capital from households
to entrepreneurs increases output even without any change in the aggregate capital stock.
4.2 Impulse Responses to Productivity Shocks
The endogenous variables are approximated as the linear functions of the state variables
in logarithms around the respective steady states of the four models (DF , FE, FC, and
RBC), which we solve using the MATLAB codes provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004). We analyze the model dynamics with respect to a transitory TFP shock in period
0, given that the models are in steady state before period 0. We first show how financial
16
frictions in the capital goods production can result in the dampened hump-shaped output
responses to the TFP shock in subsections 4.2.1. Then, we show how our basic model with
financial frictions in the entrepreneurial sector can generate more amplified and delayed
output responses in subsection 4.2.2. Finally, we show that the model with double financial
frictions does not improve the performance of our basic model much in subsection 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Financial Frictions in the Capital Goods Production
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of model RBC (dotted line) and model FC (solid
line) to a TFP shock, where Agg, FG, HH, EN, and CGP refer to aggregate, final goods,
households, entrepreneurs, and capital goods producers, respectively.
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Figure 1: Model FC vs. Model RBC
Consider model RBC first. As capital is the only endogenous state variable, the dy-
namic structure is essentially ARMA(1, 1) and fails to generate the hump-shaped output
dynamics. A 1% TFP shock raises the marginal products of intermediate goods and labor
in period 0. The rise in the price of intermediate goods makes the ex post value of the en-
trepreneurs’ project output exceed its expected value. Essentially, entrepreneurs transfer
all of the project outcomes to households via the financial intermediaries and households
17
benefit from the positive wealth effect. At the same time, the rise in the household wage
rate makes households increase labor supply by 0.7%, because they prefer to smooth con-
sumption over time. As the aggregate supply of intermediate goods is determined by the
project investment of entrepreneurs made in period −1, aggregate output of final goods
rises by 1.45% in period 0.
Due to the autocorrelation in TFP, the marginal product of intermediate goods stays
above its steady state value in period 1 and so does the price of intermediate goods. As
entrepreneurs can fully pledge the expected full value of their project to financial inter-
mediaries, they can acquire more loans and expand their project investment. The excess
demand of entrepreneurs for loans pushes up the interest rate and induces households to
deposit more at the financial intermediaries. At the same time, capital goods produc-
ers increase their investment expenditure to fully accommodate the entrepreneurs’ extra
demand for capital goods. Essentially, the model dynamics are driven by the fact that
households smooth consumption over time by saving in the form of capital goods.
Consider model FC. There are three endogenous state variables, {ket , dct , zet } and the
dynamic interactions between the price of capital and borrowing constraints of capital
goods producers can generate the hump-shaped output responses to productivity shocks,
as shown in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Kato (2006). A 1% TFP shock enables
entrepreneurs to demand more capital, as mentioned above. Because the capital goods
production is constrained by the net worth of capital goods producers, the entrepreneurs’
excess demand for capital cannot be fully accommodated and the price of capital goods
rises. In comparison with model RBC, the additional capital gains on the entrepreneurs’
capital stock raises the ex post value of the entrepreneurs’ project outcome more dramat-
ically; the ex post return on deposits also exceeds its expected value to a larger extent.
The enhanced positive wealth effect induces households to raise deposits and consumption
in a larger magnitude. Due to the unexpected increase in their deposit return, households
raise labor supply only by 0.04%, despite the rise in the wage rate. Aggregate output of
final goods rises by 1.03% in period 0, much less than 1.45% in model RBC.
The unexpected increase in the deposit return also improves the net worth of capital
goods producers, nc0 = r˜0d
c
−1 + w
c
0. At the same time, the rise in the price of capital
makes their projects more profitable and the credit multiplier rises, too. As a result,
they expand their project investment by 1.94%. However, capital goods producers are
credit-constrained and cannot fully exploit the profit opportunity in the shock period. As
a result, the increase in their project investment is smaller than the 4.4% in model RBC.
Given that the price of capital is above its steady state value in period 1, the project of
capital goods producers is still more profitable than in the steady state. In order to have
more wealth for investment in period 1, they consume less and deposit more in period
0. As a result, their net worth rises by 3.1% in period 1 and they expand the project
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investment. As their net worth is not enough, capital goods producers are constrained
and cannot fully accommodate the demand for capital goods in period 1. It also justifies
the fact that the price of capital is still above its steady state value in period 1.
Due to the credit-constrained production of capital goods, the aggregate capital stock
rises much less than in model RBC in period 0; so is aggregate output of intermediate
goods in period 1. Meanwhile, the household wage rate is 0.79% above the steady state
value in period 1. As the deposit return improves household wealth, households raise
their consumption and labor supply in period 1. Thus, aggregate output is around 1.28%
above the steady state value, still lower than the 1.4% in model RBC.
It takes two periods for capital goods producers to accumulate sufficient net worth
and accommodate the aggregate demand for capital. The price of capital converges very
closely to the steady state value from period 3 on. The interaction between the price
of capital and borrowing constraints of capital goods producers constitutes a dampened
propagation mechanism through which aggregate output peaks by 1.33% in period 2, later
and smaller than in model RBC.
4.2.2 Financial Frictions in the Entrepreneurial Sector
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of model FE (solid line) and model RBC (dotted
line). There are three endogenous state variables, {ket , kt, Ret} in model FE. Different
from the dampened propagation mechanism in model FC, it is now the dynamic interac-
tion of borrowing constraints, endogenous capital accumulation and reallocation between
entrepreneurs and households that generates the amplified and hump-shaped output re-
sponses. As the capital goods production is not subject to financial frictions, the price of
capital is constant at unity, qt = 1.
Consider model FE. A 1% TFP shock in period 0 raises the price of intermediate
goods. Extra sales revenues improve per capita post-repayment wealth of entrepreneurs,
N e0 = [be +Re(vt − E−1v0)] ke−1 > beke−1 = E−1N e0 . (40)
Entrepreneurial net worth rises, too. Due to the autocorrelation of TFP, the price of
intermediate goods is above the steady state value in period 1 and so is the expected
external value of the entrepreneurs’ projects. Thus, entrepreneurs acquire more loans and
invest more capital in their project. The deposit rate rises to clear the market.
The rise in the deposit rate induces households to deposit more and invest less in the
project in period 0. Extra sales revenues of intermediate goods have the positive wealth
effect on the household consumption and labor supply. Although the household wage rate
rises by 0.96% in period 0, they increase their labor supply only by 0.12%, much less than
0.7% in model RBC. Given the predetermined aggregate supply of intermediate goods,
aggregate output of final goods increases only by 1.1% in period 0, less than 1.45% in
model RBC.
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Figure 2: Model FE vs. Model RBC
It takes time for entrepreneurs to accumulate net worth and expand the project scale.
Thus, the entrepreneurs’ capital stock peaks five periods after the shock and the reallo-
cation of capital between entrepreneurs and households is also delayed. Given the output
of the entrepreneurs’ project accounts for more than 86% of aggregate output of inter-
mediate goods in the steady state, the latter almost follows the dynamic pattern of the
entrepreneurs’ capital stock.
Altogether, the interaction of borrowing constraints, capital accumulation and reallo-
cation constitutes a mechanism through which aggregate output of final goods peaks in
period 4 by 1.47% above the steady state value, more than the maximum output response
of 1.45% in period 0 in model RBC; while, aggregate output of final goods peaks in
period 2 by only 1.33% in model FC. In this sense, model FE dominates model FC in
generating more amplified and delayed output responses to TFP shocks.
4.2.3 Double Financial Frictions
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of model DF (dash-dot line) and model FE (solid
line). Both entrepreneurs and capital goods producers are subject to financial constraints
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and there are six endogenous state variables, {kt, ket , zet , Ret , rt, dct} in model DF . The
dynamic interactions between the price of capital and double financial frictions reinforce
the amplification mechanism of model FE.
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Figure 3: Model FE vs. Model DF
Consider model DF . A 1% TFP shock in period 0 pushes up the price of intermediate
goods. Extra sales revenues improve entrepreneurial net worth. It enables entrepreneurs
to acquire more loans and invest more capital into their project. Due to the constrained
production of capital goods, the price of capital rises in period 0.
Extra sales revenues and capital gains have positive effects on the household wealth in
period 0. Households consume and deposit more than in model FE. Despite the rise in
the wage rate, households reduce labor supply. Aggregate output of final goods rises by
0.85%, even less than the magnitude of the TFP shock. Meanwhile, the rise in the price
of capital depresses the the household project investment more than in model FE.
The rise in the price of capital makes the project of capital goods producers more
profitable. They borrow more and expand their investment in period 0. As the price of
capital is still above the steady state value in period 1, capital goods producers reduce
consumption and increase deposits in period 0 in order to have more wealth for investment
in period 1. The rise in the deposits of households and capital goods producers reduces
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the interest rate in period 0. In contrast, the interest rate rises in period 0 in model FE.
The decline in the interest rate rate and the further improvement in entrepreneurial
net worth due to capital gains enable entrepreneurs to increase their project investment
slightly more than in model FE. Thus, the rise in the price of capital speeds up the
reallocation of capital from households to entrepreneurs in period 0.
However, due to financial frictions, the demand of entrepreneurs for capital is con-
strained in period 0. It explains that the rise in the price of capital is much smaller than
in model FC. The increase in the deposits of capital goods producers in period 0 improves
their net worth in period 1 and they can expand their project investment by 8.4%, still
smaller than in model FE. It does not fully accommodates the entrepreneurs’ demand
for capital and the price of capital is still above the steady state value in period 1.
It takes two periods for capital goods producers to accumulate net worth and accom-
modate the demand for capital after the shock. The price of capital gets closer to the
steady state level rather quickly. The dynamic pattern and the magnitude of the responses
of the entrepreneurs’ capital stock do not differ much from those in model FE after period
3. Aggregate output of final goods peaks by 1.49% in period 4, slightly higher than 1.47%
in model FE. In this sense, financial frictions and the reallocation of capital in model FE
can explain the amplified and hump-shaped output responses to TFP shocks alone.
5 Conclusion
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to explain one of
the important empirical puzzles in the real business cycles literature. Compared to other
models with financial frictions in the literature, the dynamic interaction of borrowing
constraints, endogenous capital accumulation and reallocation in our model constitutes
a robust mechanism through which aggregate output responds to TFP shocks in a more
amplified and hump-shaped fashion, in line with the empirical evidence in the literature.
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